Monetary policy has been one of the least understood and much debated topics economic histonan from the larger suD|eci oí i.o»« rel«rion«hÍD TL-^.Ai^c AP nrocess of monev creaOon in Chile and its teiauonsnip 7rL^:r^l^Gt:nZ2:lc^Jcs «f ^e anean ecónomo * .tH", ^ÍcluZírSherence to d.e gold sU.ndard -« "»* P^^^^^^f Jj* 6^^^^^^^^^ naive experiments with die real bilis doctrine provided the economy wd, financal stability.
INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy is one of the least understood topics in Chilean economic history; although its likely impact has been much debated. The historical debate concentrates only on a narrow monetary aggregate: the amount of fiscal notes in circulation and lacks a clear understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism as well as the functioning of commercial banks as money creators. An ideological commitment to convertibihty has ahenated economic historians from the larger subject of the costs and benefits of different monetary and exchange rate regimes, thus creating the impression that monetary policy was one of the country's big failures during this period.
The aim of this paper is to give a general view of Chilean monetary history during the XIXth century and the first quarter of the XXth century. This paper studies the evolution of different monetary aggregates -monetary base, money supply and credit-as a result of relationship between policy makers and the banking community. It also studies the relationship between the monetary aggregates and the general price level, the domestic interest rate, the spread between the latter and the International one and the exchange rate.
There are few recent works on Chilean monetary history: Lueders (1968), A Monetary History of Chile: 1925 -1958 , and Zahler et al. (1979 , Estadisticas Monetarias de Chile: 1940 -1975 , do not include the period covered by this paper. Among contemporary histories, the most interesting are Subercaseaux (1922) Monetary and Banking Policy of Chile, Fetter (1931) Monetary Inflation in Chile and Santelices (1900) Bancos de Emisión. These works share three deficiencies: (1) a narrow definition of money, which includes only fiduciary currency in circulation, (2) a view of the money market in isolation that does not allow to see the difference between open market operations and déficit financing and (3) a difficulty in seeing banks as financial intermediarles trying to set their portfolio so as to maximize profits, thus implying the lowest possible reserve ratio.
The paper has six chronologically organized sections and a final section with conclusions. The second section describes monetary developments until 1878. The third section studies the period 1879/80 until 1894. The fourth section describes the ill-fated return to convertibility of 1895. The fifth section deals with the policies adopted fi-om 1898 until 1908. The sixth section runs ft-om 1909 until 1925. The final section sums up the conclusions of the paper.
THE GOLDEN PESO: 1818-1878
Chile inherited from Spain the colonial bi-metallic standard; after Independence in 1818 the Mint continued coining silver and gold pesos according to colonial weightL Monetary Laws of 1832 and 1834 established the metallic contení of the silver peso in 24.43 grams of fine silver and that of the gold peso in 1.48 grams of fine gold, implying a ratio of 1:16.51; however in Europe the same ratio was 115 72. In other words, the Chilean Mint undervalued silver with respect to Europe; consequently, silver coins were driven out of circulation Monetary Laws of 1851 and 1860 slightly reduced the metallic content of the silver peso to 22.5 grams of fine metal and that of gold to 1.3725 grams of fine metal. The new price of gold was 1:16.39, still below the market rate: 1:15.25 at the time. The par exchange rate between the Chilean gold peso and the pound sterling was 5.335 pesos or forty-five pence. Although there are detailed statistics on the activity of L Mint since colonial times, the stock of coins in circulation is unknown; since 1844 it is possible to calcúlate changes in the stock of coins because there are figures on coinage as well as imports and exports of numeraire, unfortunately coin exports were taxed, therefore the available figures are not reliable^ Banks did not opérate until the 1850s and those established then, d^ no have the right to issue notes. However, the economys -P'^ ¿^ opm n raised the demand for money: contemporary businessmen c aimed that the lack of fiduciary currency was a major hindrance for the ^onntrys^^^ác-velopment They argued that metallic currency did not have sufficient elas-;tTo accomm'odate the growing financ^l needs of the -00^. A^^^^^^^^^^ discussion, on July 1860, Congress passed a bill authonzing he estblsh t of banks of issue. According to the law, banks could issue notes upto ^50 per^ cent of their paid-in-capital and reserves, notes were redeemable on demand n gold orsíver currency, otherwise they became executive orders against the in gold or siiver curici.v-j-, ctockholders. Note ssue had to be bank's assets and the personal wealth of ctockholders. 1 L A/t-* ."^ Kanlc! had to submit monthly balances to tne iviin registered at the Mint and banks nao 10 *"" • reTUic low pstablished a system of competitive banks ot issue, istry of F--"-Jh'^'^J "'sit-reserve ratio to the banks' management. kaving note backing and the depos.t ^.^^ ^^^ ^.^^ ^^^^ ^^ .^ These liberal P-s-s " d toJ,e con.d ^^^^J^.^^.^.^ X r pi: ai ^^^^^^^^^^ of issue multiplied in number and the Atter the passage 01 narticularly since 1866, as shown in Table I . volume of their operations soared, P^^'^^'^^^^ consequence of two fortuiThis extraordinary development ca-about a con^q ^^ ^^^ ^.^^ ^^ tous events: (1) the J^^ ^^^^^^¡^^^^^^^^^ expenses generver mine of Caracoles in l»/u. 10 mía ated by the war, the government secured a loan from a syndicate of domestic banks; one of the loan's condition was the government's acceptance of notes issued by the participating banks in payment of taxes and dues. From 1860 to 1866, the government had been adamant in demanding specie for these payments, by accepting bank notes paper currency became de jacto legal tender '. Consequently, the public substituted the more convenient paper notes for coins; banks were eager to satisfy this exogenous increase of the demand for paper currency. Table I shows that from 1865 to 1870 bank notes multiplied 2.86 times and deposits 8.34. ' By defacto legal tender we mean that there was no law forcing the use of paper currency. In the course of the next four years the government began to accept notes issued by any bank.
The boom provoked by the discovery of Caracoles was without precedents in the Chilean economy, historians describe the years 1870 to 1875 as a penod of frenzy speculation. Figures in Table I do not contradict them: credit multiphed 2 times, deposits 1.9 and bank notes 2 times during those six years.
This extraordinary growth of banking activities was on shaky grounds. A monetary system with convertible currency and without a central bank requ.res banks of issue to keep an appropriate level of bullion reserves ready to fence of pames and crises. Here, however, the ratio of specie holdings to bank notes and that of specie holdings to bank notes plus deposits fell continuously from 1861 up to the first semester of 1878. The share of specie holdings in total assets fell con..nuous y: the average for the period 1861-1868 was 16.1 percent that for the Pe"od 1869Uo 1877 was 7.5 percent, and it was only 5 percem in the fírst semester of 1878. This low level of specie reserves made Chilean banks particularly vulnerable to external crises. Balance of Payments problems were bound to turn mto financial cnses as happened in the late 1870s. ^, . r . "^U^A;« Table II shows the path to the crisis of 1878. The pr.ce of exports reached it second highest level for the period in 1872 and although falhng. the level for the nexttwoyearswasabovetheaverageofthepre 187 penod Frojnt^^^^^^^^^^ prices began a sharp decline, reaching their lowest level -^^^^/^J^^^^'/^P^^^^^ declined and, as indicated in Table III , the trade balance began to «ho^ deficu^ The external shock was compounded by a domest.c shock: --"8;^ ^ad harve s in 1875 1876 and 1877 provoked an increase in the domest.c pnce level and a reduction'ofmorethanfor.percentonwh.^^^^^^^^^^ exchange rate appreciated by more than th.rty percen n-om fore the level of imports rose, ^^^f^:^::^^, thus reducing The -™\ f ^^^-7-t^^^ ¿^^^^^^^^ predicts that banks banks' specie hold.ngs. The P"";?";'^ ^able I Chilean banks reduced the should reduce the money supply, as shown .n 1 awe 1, ^n
• T uu TTT indicares that as the external .mbalance loomea, spec.e reserve rat.o. Table 111 .ndicates tnai a " , , ""tnmiiúc adiust-™"ey -notes plus ^ J»'-'"^ °1 " , ,.', (TMe I). By n,,d 1878 ru™o" wh,le sp.™ reserves =''l^™>» '¿™ ,^^,^ """, f¡,U Ae h.lls of Santiago and ;Z:^ttEtKfn^^.^:ullb , j j • Tokip n is a Droxv for variations in the price of nonThe domestic price Índex included m l^^l^J "ansportation costs allowed for a large traded goods. Although wheat was a traded ^°""°'''^' i J^i,, "f ^heat rose by more than 30 spread between FOB and CIF prices; in those years, domestic p percent without inducing a flow of imports. banks and in June 1878 there was a run on the country's largest bank. Banks' reserves were equal to only 7.58 percent of outstanding notes plus deposits and fortyone percent of outstanding notes: they could not face a financial panic. (1) Domestic price index tries to capture non-traded prices, it includes six producís: bran, beans, wheat, corn, flour and one cow.
(2) Exports price index is a Paasche index that includes three commodities: copper, silver and wheat whose share on Chilean exports was above 75 %, prices are those observed in London.
(3) Real exchange rate = (Nominal exchange rate/Domestic price index) *Sauerbeck price index. (1) Trade balance does not include specie «ade of Bovernment's extemal debt. (2) Current account equals the trade balance ™ ^^""<=^ 8°^""'" (3) Difference between imports ^"j^^.^r^^^^^^eT"'the stock of coins plus the change in the (4) Change in the nioney .^"PP'^ ^'''^r *tn3 balance of specie trade plus coinage by stock of bank money. Change in the stock «^coms equais tne D the Mint, bank money equals outstandmg b.*f^"°'f, ^ ^^,//fo, 1372, therefore the change ofthe (5) We did not have access to cominerc.al banks balances to motley supply for 1873 was calculated for the years 1871 and 1873. SOURCE: A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, 1860 -1925 r^ TI 1 qri 8781 don Melchor Concha y Toro, representing the Boardof «On July 19 [jS^S] , don Me en .^^^^ p.^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ Directors of the Banco Nacional ^e Chüe-^o ^^ ^ situation of the bank. In a few days its metalic ^"^fj^"" P^ j^ ^^e authpesos» 3. Faced with the failure ofthe country's ^-'^^^'.'"J^to^s Lies decreed a .oratoHu. -^^^l-XS^^^^^^ ^ Traditionally, it has been argued '^l'^'f'^^^^^^ banks of issue, when a maior mistake 1 However, w.th.n a ^y^r'^^^^^Zoíthc rest ofthe banks maior bank faces a run the --^^ fjingaLon the financial system. In this only tends to make matters worse becormng a ru ^^^^^^ ^^^ .^ case the authorities acted as a ^ie^ocen ral bank and so doing they prevented even greater evils.
YEARS OF THE PAPER PESO: 1880-1894
The authorities considered inconvertibility transitory: it was to last only until banks were able to increase their metallic reserves. Accordingly, the government did not issue a single note. The traumatic events of June 1878 prompted the government to reform the Banking Law of 1860 by introducing a guarantee requirement for outstanding bank notes as well as for new issues. This backing was equal to twenty-five per cent of total issue and was to be met by deposits of mortgage bonds, government bonds or buUion with the Treasury. This regulation implicitly established a market regulated mechanism for creating high powered money: whenever banks wanted to increase their note issue by one peso, they had to deposit mortgage bonds worth twenty-five cents at the Treasury. This mechanism does not differ from contemporary open market operations carried out by central banks to control the money supply, except that here there was no central bank. The outcome of this rule under a system of competing banks of issue is to peg the nominal interest rate, with the money supply accommodating to changes in the money demand. Given these conditions, the interest rate is the best indicator of the direction of monetary policy: rising interest rates are sign of contractionary policy, while falling rates suggest expansionary policy; stable interest rates point toward accommodating the money supply to changes in the demand for real cash balances. Given that Chile is a small country, she did not have control over the international interest rate; therefore, the acid test for monetary policy is the evolution of the interest rate differential -spread-between domestic and foreign rates'.
The new regime did not have enough time work before a new shock: by February 1879 winds of war crossed the country and on April 1879, Chile declared war to Perú and Bolivia. The already difficult fiscal situation became more acute. Being unable to secute a new loan from the banks, for the first time in history, the government issued legal tender notes. There were three issues: the finst in 1879 for twelve million pesos, the second in 1880 for fourteen million pesos and the third in 1880 for two million pesos.
The rapid increase of the monetary base and of the money stock in 1879 and ' From 1840 ' From to 1928 Chile had easy access to international capital markets: she raised large amount of funds at relatively lew cost. The return on Chilean government bonds denominated in convertible currencies -French francs, Germán marks and British pounds-was lower than the return on Italian government bonds denominated in convertible currencies. Return on Chilean bonds followed the London rates without a clear indication of the market up-or downgrading the country's risk. The spread between the domestic interest rate and the return on Chilean bonds denominated in convertible currencies is the proper test for monetary policy, however, continuous data on the return of those bonds is not available at the moment. 1880 resulted in a reduction of the domestic interest rate and of the spread _ n fact during the war -1879 to 1883-the interest rate and the spread fell wh le the nominal exchange rate fluctuated around $ 6.50 per pound and domestic prices stabilized. The new monetary regime proved to be quite stable m face of a war, not a small feat. In 1884 there was a severe extemal «^ock the price of ni-.ate, no. the country's most -^^^^^^X^^^--percent with respect to the previous three year average. ne leve tivity dropped and so did the demand for money. but as shown in Table IV , domes! interest rate and the spread varied very litt e, a sign «f the -tomatic c commodation of the money supply to changes in the 7^^f ^^^^^f/^^^^^^^^^^ the price of this kind of stabiHty was nominal and real exchange rate deprecia ion however, the change in relative prices shifted production to -ded goods nd consumpdon to non-traded goods. helping to cióse the externa ,p. In nterestin. to note that the crisis of 1884/85 was more severe than that of 1877/78. ^df country been under the gold standard in ^^^^/']^<^^-^^l-^:, formed Banking Law, the extemal crisis would have generated the same kind of financial disruption as in 1878.
• .:"""f.u»pvrhaneerate
Although the new regime proved its worth, f JP^^ ^ °^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ dominated policy makers considerations from 1880 to 'f^J^^^^^^^^^^^ problem was a difficult one: a trade off between financial ^^^^^^ll^^^^ Lty...eauthoritiesthphtthecau.^^^^^^^^^^ fiscal notes. Consequently, they tried to reduce tne circu ing to appreciate the peso. The first conversión law, passed m March 1887, came about as a result of these id^as^ installments of $ The law required ^^e 8°^^™"° ""^'J^^ circulation of fiscal notes had 100,000 in fiscal notes, this was to be ¿-^l^^^^^' ^^e government had to been reduced to eigh.en -'"-" ^^f^^^ jj^^^^^^^^^^^^ hoard silver for the redemption of the outstanding n jj jl ^^ the backing for bank notes to fifty percent, however, this guarantee met with mortgage b^nds^ ^^ ^^^ j^^ To prompt currency Hie authonties dully ^^^^^^'^^^^^^ of fiscal notes at the Treasury. appreciation they also began to '^''^1^'^° ,^^^^ ^iped out by the banks. These contractionary measures were almost completeiy w p , • , J mnní-v as «the set of assets that constrains the ^ Balbach and Burger (1976) define high P"'^^'^^'^"^^^^^ ^hich the Consolidated banking secgrowth of the money stock», and identib' these ass ^^^^ li^bilities which are used as money». tor uses to settle interbank debt and those, asme ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^¡ outstanding fiscal Using these concepts, starting 1878 '^e/"onetary basej eq ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^j^.^j^ ^^^ notes in the hands of the public and the banks, plus twenty the backing in mortgage bonds. Table V shows that while the government tried to reduce fiscal notes, the banks increase the amount of bank notes in circulation. Contrary to policy makers expectations, the exchange rate did not appreciate: it remained at a level of $ 9.55 per pound (see Table IV ). (1) Outstanding Fiscal Notes are equal to Outstanding Registered Fiscal notes minus deposits of fiscal notes at the Treasury. On January 1891, a mounting institutional conflict between the President and Congress led to a Civil War. From a monetary standpoint, the eífect of the war was an explosión of the monetary base: it rose by more than sixty percent while the money supply rose by twenty-seven percent. The exchange -te depreaated accordingly: it dropped from an average of $ 9.55 per pound from 1885 to 1890 to $ 12.76 in 1891.
. , , The new administration inaugurated in October 1891 retired more than ten million pesos from circulation during 1892 and passed a second conversión law. The law's main provisions were (1) the establishment of a new currency umt: the peso of twenty-four pence, i.e., ten pesos per pound, (2) the mcmeration of one third of outstanding registered fiscal notes, (3) the return to convertib.hty by December 1895: on that date fiscal notes were to be redeemed m «>lver peso co,n of twenty-five grams or a new gold coin worth twenty-four pence, and (4) the e a bUshment o?a bullion reserve requirement of twenty percent on bank note. sue. The combined effect of these two measures provoke a senous monetary co^rac-tion during the first quarter of 1893. The government response ^^^^^Ji milhon pesos and to pass a third conversión law that postponed resumption until June 1896 but kept all the other provisions of the previous law Thecombinedeffectofthesetwoconversionlawswasadechnemthestocko credtdeposús and themoneysupply.Banksmetthebulhonreserve requirement r ^ , . ,• • , "A of inrreasine their net worth, which were the auby liquidatmg credit instead of mcreasing mcu ", ;" i «OÍ ^"A I 004 L • .
• M^",in<.l and real money stock were lowerm 1893 and 1894 thorities' expectations. Nommal ano reai munt)' ^"r^-, j ís^e 1 .u A^rr^^^tir interest rate rose as did tne spreaa isee than in 1892, consequendy the domestic interesi ra i 35 Table IV ). All these added to the resumption at a higher rate than the market exchange rate should have produced currency appreciation, but on the contrary, there was currency depreciation: the peso fell by fifty percent from 1892 to 1893, it recovered by a mere nine percent in 1894. A game theoretical explanation suggests that the government's threat of returning to convertibility on a fu ture date -three years ahead-with a distorted parity between silver and gold and at a higher than the market exchange rate was not credible, the public worried by the issue of Treasury Notes in 1893 tried to hedge against a depreciation -instead of appreciation-thus effectively depreciated the exchange rate.
There is an additional hypothesis for the depreciation. The price of silver fell by almost forty percent from 1892 to 1894. The price of silver is crucial because the government did not say in which metal resumption was going to take place, the public, perhaps correctly, assumed that it was going to happen in silver, the lesser expensive alterative for the government, therefore the peso had to fall with silver.
PARADISE RECOVERED: GOLD STANDARD IN ACTION, 1895-1898
In February 1895, after three years in office and a great deal of maneuvering, President Montt put together a coalition with enough support in Congress to pass a definitive conversión law. It set a new parity of 13.33 pesos per pound or eighteen pence per peso as of June 1,1895, date in which the government was to begin redeeming the outstanding fiscal notes. The law required banks to fully back their notes with bullion deposited at the Mint, however, until 1897 banks could fulfill this requirement by depositing fiscal notes, government bonds, mortgage bonds or municipal bonds. The law also set a limit to the amount of total bank notes at twenty-four million pesos, effectively rescinding the banks' right to issue notes because by the time the amount of outstanding bank notes was 21.4 million pesos. Congress authorized the President to sell nitrate fields for financing the operation This conversión scheme altered the monetary system in fundamental ways. The retirement of fiscal notes made it similar to the pre -1878 system, the main difference being the 100 percent bullion backing for bank notes and the fact that the amount of bank notes in circulation was fixed. The creation of high powered money was under neither government or bank control; it depended, as in the pre-1878 period, on the economy's external balance. Also it should be noted that this time the authorities explicitly introduced a mono-metallic standard based in gold.
Simply passing a law does not solve the complexities of returning to convertibility. The government had enough gold to redeem its own notes, but commercial banks did not. Aware of these circumstances, the authorities passed an additional law in May 1895 establishing that the Treasury would fully redeem secured bank notes m gold coins as ,f they were fiscal notes I Banks would recover their notes by gmng To the government their gold valué. They also could give letters of credit with a 6.1 interest rate and a monthly three percent sinking fiínd; m th.s ca-"o^s wou d not be returned to the banks. The law also limited the amount of bank notes to those already registered with the Mint.
,L" """^.,", The conversión scheme had several problems, some related to the monetary system, others to the fi^nctioning of the economy In terms of the -neta^. ys em • uV i, j • .;.."l«tinnandefrectivelyeiminatedfiduciarycurrencyatter itestab ished specie circulation ana ciic«,uvi.;-. . ,. . 1897. A monetary system with this characteristics curtails financ.al ^-^-^f^^^ by commercial banks. The law was bound to genérate a ^--^^'''^^ ^^"^^^^^^ stock. However, once the short-term impact of the conversión -J -^'^^ -w law did not solve the perennial problem °f ^^'1-banking l e^^^^^^ overexpansion. There was no provisión requinng banks to hold any reserve over ( ,r. fhnse banks that had deposited with the Treasury . Fully secured bank notes were note^^r^^^^^^^^^^ specie and/or government bonds, fiscal notes, municipd issues.
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deposits. In other words, this conversión strategy was a return to square one, to the pre-1878 situation, the only difference being that banks were not able to issue notes, so that external shocks would be transmitted faster to the domestic economy.
The short-term impact of the monetary contraction was amplified bccause the exchange rate fixed for conversión was not the current rate: the average rate in 1893 was sixteen pesos per pound, in 1894,19.5 pesos, in January 1895,16.9 pesos and in February 1895, 15.1 pesos. From there on the exchange rate appreciated fast to reach 13.56 pesos in June. Business conditions, which were already weak due to the world crisis, further deteriorated due to appreciation. Subercaseaux described a grim situation: «Of the nine existing banks [...] seven were constituted as incorpórate companies; and of these four were compelled to cióse their doors.» Later, «Interest rates undenvent an extraordinary increase, while the quotation of mortgage bonds and other securities suffered a pronounced decline, as did the valué of rural and urban properties. All this, moreover, was accompanied by an extraordinary paralysation of business and general restriction of credit.» * Fetter concentrated on the severity of the external shock: Chilean prices were low in gold terms and there were poor grain harvests in 1894, 1895 and 1897. «The serious economic situation is shown in the decline in the operations of the banks, the rise in interest rates, and the abrupt increase in the payments in arrears to the Caja de Crédito Hipotecario» ^. Valdes Vergara wrote that the 1895 conversión caused «... slow and painful sacrifices that were the cause of many misfortunes; desolating many households who had ruinously liquídate solid business fortunes and prosperous business. [These sacrifices] enriched some with the deprivation of others producing new elements of social discord and unrest.» "^ As shown in Table VII , there was a severe depression in banking activity: deposits fell by more than forty percent while credit operations fell by twenty percent from June to December of 1895. This extraordinary shrinkage is the result of two combined and reinforcing causes: the public tried to reduce its holdings of deposits to obtain gold coins, and at the same time banks were forced to build up bullion reserves equal to 100 percent of their issues. The only way out was an absolute reduction in the stock of credit. Table VIII shows the movements of the money supply components during this period. Besides the banking depression, the virtual elimination of fiscal notes provoked a fall of more than twenty percent in the nominal money stock. This Subercaseaux (1922 ), p. 115. Fetter(1931 , plOl. » Valdes Vergara (1913), p. U, figure was probably higher because the public was inclined to hoard gold coms instead of using them; at least this is what contemporary economists observed. In fact the ratio of currency in hands of the public to deposits rose from twenty percent in June 1895 to 48.7 percent in June 1898. But this was a rational attitude: given bad business conditions, banks solvency problems and an extremely dehcate situation with Argentina, expectations of returning to inconvertibihty were high; and with inconvertibility there was the possibility of reahzmg a new capital gain by sticking to one's coins. (1) The monetary base is equal to banks' reserves plus the amount of coins in the hands of the non-banking public. Note that bank reserves can only be specie or gold coins and that it is possible to calcúlate the stock of coins in the system because the amount of notes redeemed is known and so is specie trade. SOURCE; A. Liona, Chilean Monetary Policy, Appendix C.
By the end of 1897 and beginning of 1898 the crisis was slowly passing. However, a long standing border dispute with Argentina became quite acute. Congress held long secret sessions during May and June of 1898 debating the possibility of war and the government raised defense expenditure and negotiated the purchase of two new batdeships.
The shaky situation of the remaining banks, added to rumors of an imminent return to inconvertibility due to the coming war, provoked a run on the banks of Santiago and Valparaíso. Fetter reported «... on Tuesday, July 5 [1898], a heavy run started on the Santiago office of the Banco de Chile, by far the most important bank in the country. The run continued on July 6 with even greater seventy, although it did not spread to other banks or cides in Chi e A panic existed which, if left unchecked, would have certainly resulted in the failure of the bank.» In view of these circumstances the authorities ordered the banks o cbse their doors for four days. Congress, meeting in secret sess.on on July 11 1898, passed a moratorium forbidding any executive action leading to foreclosures L thirty days. On July 31, 1898, Congress passed a bill restoring inconveribil ty. The law authorLed the government to issue fifty milhon pesos of lega tender notes, inclusive of the existing bank notes, the existing bank notes were dedaredfiscl.Themostimportantprovisionoftheawwastorescmdcommerda banks-right to issue notes. The bill also estabUshed that the government cotld use as'much of the new issue as needed to ^0^^^^^^^^;^^^^^^^ crunch. By July 6, 1898, outstanding bank notes carne to 19,056,548 pesos and by the end of the month they had received hrom the government 21.666,541 pesos -ThLction added to inconvertibility, stopped the run on the banks S reeslblished public confidence in the banks.
^^^¡¡lli;^^^^^ depreciation: the peso fell from $ 13.91 per pound m June to $ 18.28 in September and $ 18.82 in December ^f 8. government could not dilute After thirty-seven months «^ ^T; '^ ^¿t thepublic'sexpectationofanev ^al^^^^^^^^^^^ ^.^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^p,,l high interestrate and spread for thspn^^^ circumstances converge to inflows constitute proof of this ^''"''^ . .^^ the law had four serious transform expectations into realizationsJn he firs^^^^^^^^^^ technicalmistakes:(l).tsettheparrat $ 3^^^^^^^^^^^ was$ 19.10,i.e.,itimpl.adycarried pnced^^^^^^^^^ JP ^ ^.^.^^^ ^^^^^^ full bullion backing for bank notes ^ut "jl^J°^\"j ^^^¿i, (3, ¡, established ratio for deposits, thus permitting ^^f^^^^^'^^d to be paid in coinsspecie circulation -taxes -f J-^^; ^^^^^^^^^ which aggravated the crisis of July 1898 and (4) ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ or, at least, acurrency board that ^oM^^l^cyísasevereexternal shock: the second place, the economy faced duri^^^^^^^^^^^^^ could be maintained. 
1898-1908: FROM ABSTINENCE TO INDULGENCE
The new monetary arrangements, by rescinding the banks' right to issue notes, made the Treasury the solé institution empowered to issue fiduciary money. Inconvertibility severed the link between balance of payments and monetary base. Although this feature may be welcome, the new arrangements did not provide a mechanism for supplying high powered money. Subercaseaux stated that «The new monetary system, reduced as it was to a fixed circulation of Treasury notes, was absolutely inelastic.» '^ The monetary base became solely the stock of fiscal notes in circulation, and its change the result of discretionary policy.
This monetary system was among the weakest in Chilean history; money supply was left to fluctuate due to changes of the deposits multiplier, i.e., banks' reserve ratio, which, in turn, is the outcome of the banks' portfolio management. By then, the government had saved the banks in July 1878, May 1893 and July 1898; therefore, the profit function of the banks incorporated the already fulfilled expectation of the government acting as lender of last resort. Consequently, the deposit reserve ratio was lower than the one implicit in the banking law; which established unlimited liability. Therefore, the authorities' aim to limit credit overexpansion by rescinding the banks' right to issue notes backfired in an ominous way: banks expanded by reducing the reserve ratio, thus increasing the likelihood of insolvency.
The economy accommodated rapidly to the new regime. By mid-1899 the exchange rate had appreciated to $ 15.48 per pound. The domestic interest rate declined from 8.95 percent in 1898 to 7.87 percent in 1900, the spread declined from 6.67 in 1898 to 6.04 in 1899 and 5.33 in 1900. General business conditions improved while commercial banks fully recovered and expanded rapidly. Table IX shows the tremendous expansión of loans and deposits from 1898 to 1904. However, the same Table depicts that this expansión was on weak foundations: commercial banks not only reduced their reserve ratio, but the absolute level of reserves dwindled from 1898 to 1904.
Falling domestic interest rate and spread plus improvement of Chilean export prices had positive effects on the domestic economy, particularly investment expenditure. The economy experienced a stock market boom accompanied by an outburst of financial speculation, especially after 1904. Capital incorporated into new joint stock companies rose from an annual average of 18.6 million gold pesos from 1900 to 1903 to 66.6 in 1904, 174.92 in 1905 and 172.7 The open market operation '^°'"P°"^"; f/J^hTdomeTtic interest rate, and mortgage bonds, produced the -f^.^j^'^^^^^^^^ curiouslyenough the spreadalsofell-Under norma ^^ (1) This price index intends to capture non-traded goods price level, from 1899 until 1908 it ineludes, with equal weights, twelve agricultural commodities; from 1908 until 1925 the index is a weighted average between the previous one and a wholesale price index for manufactures; the weights are given by the relative importance in production of the two sectors. The index base is 1913 equal to 100. Under these favorable conditions, bank credit further expanded and speculation in the stock market continued unabated. Bank reserves, however, started to dwindle again early in 1906. In March 1906, Subercaseaux set reserves at 22.2 million pesos '6. Assuming deposits did not change from December 1905 to March 1906, the reserve ratio would have been only 7.8 percent. By April 1906 there were rumors about the banks' lack of liquidity, these rumors affected, in particular, the biggest commercial bank ". But as in other occasions, Congress was ready to help and on May 1906 it authorized the issue of forty million pesos in fiscal notes. Of these, twenty million became government revenue and twenty million could be taken by credit institutions or privare citizens against gold deposits of eighteen pence per peso. In case these funds were not taken by the public, they could be ' <> Subercaseaux (1922 ), p. 121. " Subercaseaux (1912 deposited in the banks for future governmental use. Bemg the market exchange rate much lower and the gold given in exchange for ñscal notes not returnable. the operation was not profitable and thus not performed, henee the authormes deposited twenty million pesos in the banks.
SoURCES
. fíW .^r.^nt In 1906 the monetary base rose by forty milhon pesos, almost fifty percent while the nominal money stock grew by 28.8 percent. ^s «me pnces rose by 33^ percentandtheexchangeratedepreciatedby8.65percentBesidesj^^snflaU^^^^^^^ impact the new issue postponed the bursting of the speculative bubble and bank impací, tne n F F ^.^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ¿^¿ ^^^ reserves were restored to í).í perccm i<i" r>""".t,vinfpr «duce the interest t.K mo"e, ente,=d th. monetary policy consisting of lump-sum increases of the monetary base whenever banks ran out of reserves. Consequently, the law authorizing the 1907 money issue also estabUshed the Oficina de Emisión. Its goals were to stabilize the exchange rate and to provide elasticity to the circulating media. This agency was to issue legal tender notes against gold deposits at a fixed exchange rate of eighteen pence per peso. Depositors would receive a nominative but endorsable certifícate stating the amount of gold deposited as well as the amount of fiscal notes issued in their favor. Depositors could use this certifícate to withdraw their gold by returning the same amount of notes originally issue to them. The Ofícina de Emisión, in turn, had to destroy the returned notes. There were no restrictions to issue new legal tender notes guaranteed by gold, but the already existing 150 million pesos of outstanding registered fiscal notes remained inconvertible. Operating with Oficina de Emisión depended on profítability which, in turn, was a function of the market exchange rate and the spread between deomestic and international interest rates. At the time this legislation passed, the market exchange rate was 10.78 pence per peso, therefore the operation would have been profitable if the spread was above fifty-nine percentage points. Consequently, the Oficina de Emisión did not function.
Monetary and banking activities expanded rapidly until 1911. As shown in Table XI , this development started from a fixed monetary base, therefore the money stock grew only via deposit creation and by reducing the reserve ratio. As in other instances, banks began to complain about the scarcity of circulating media in 1911. Fetter described the situation as «currency starvation» ". Lack of reserves became so acute that in March 1912 Banco de Chile, the country's biggest bank, deposited a total of£ 600.000 with the Ofícina de Emisión, obtaining eight million pesos to enlarge its reserves ^'^. In addition to the banking crunch, the government decided to sell fífty million pesos of mortgage bonds it owned thus depressing their price and raising the domestic interest rate ^^. Banks trying to accumulate reserves plus the government selling bonds generated a monetary contraction that weakened overall business activity. (See Table XII) .
To no one surprise banks asked the government for help, but this time public opinión was against lump-sum issues of currency. The authorities modified some regulations of the Oficina de Emisión: (1) the parity was set at twelve pence, (2) banks had to increase their gold deposits in case of appreciation and (3) banks could obtain notes up to the valué of their net worth. " Fetter(1931 ), p. 127. 2» Fetter(1931 ), p. 128. 21 Martner (1923 , p. 617. 
1909
''''°' were disastrous for Chile: the nitrate market coUapsed, reducing government revenues and generating a fiscal crisis of dramatic proportions. On the monetary side, there was a quasi-financial panic as people withdrew their deposits from commercial banks, especially those of Germán ownership. Nitrate producers paralyzed their activities and laid off thousand of miners. With the major industry of the country on the verge of closing and banks becoming rapidly insolvent, the administration acted rapidly to help both bankers and miners. It prometed legislation to keep the level of nitrate production at pre-war levéis and to help banks. (1) Monetary figures for 1914 are balances at June 30 and December 31, exchange rate figures are monthly averages for June and December.
(2) This price Índex intends to capture non-traded goods price level, from 1899 until 1908 it includes, with equal weights, twelve agricultura! commodities; from 1908 until 1925 the index is a weighted average between the previous one and a wholesale price index for manufactures; the weights are given by the relative importance in production of the two sectors.
SoURCES: Same as Table X. To help the banks Congress authorized the issue of Treasury Notes in favor of the banks. These notes were legal tender to be used in any transact.on. Banks had to satisíy the following conditions to obtain notes: (1) they had to pay interest on those notes set at three percentage points lower than their lending rate, (2) they had to guarantee this issue with mortgage bonds and/or goyernment bonds but these bonds would be valued at ninety percent of their market quotat.on and (3) they could receive Treasury notes up to fifty percent of their net worth Although this law was intended to last one year, it operated until the foundation of the Central Bank in 1925. This open market operation was similar to the one performed during the 1880s, but more costly: the Treasury charged not only mterest but received the guarantee at ninety percent of its market valué. Subercaseaux clajms that this operation was very expensive for the banks, particularly because they were not lending these additional funds but increasing the.r reserves ^ _ To help hard-pressed nitrate producers to keep production levéis, the authorities implemented a special lending program. It consisted «^ 8^-""^ ^«^^^ ^ of $ 87 per metric ton ready to export and $ 65 per metric ton processed m pl nuo all producers who agreed to keep their mines runnmg. The loans ^^^J^^^^^^ form of letters of credit issued by the Treasury with mtrate as guarantee. These Instruments of credit could be discounted by the banks and they could use these letters of credit as collateral for obtaining Treasury notes As shown by " Subercaseaux (1922 ), p. 158. " Subercaseaux (1922 ), p. 156. » Fetter (1931 Martner (1923), p. 622. increased reserves to reach a reserve ratio of twenty percent, an unusual figure in Chilean history (see Table XI ). The nitrate market began to improve by the end of 1915. From there on Chilean economic situation began to strengthen and commercial banks started to expand again. As in previous periods, banks expanded by reducing their reserve ratio, instead of using the newly established mechanisms to expand the monetary base. Table XII shows that by 1918 the reserve ratio had fallen to 10.7 percent. It was certainly less expensive to increase the credit multiplier instead of performing open market operations or depositing gold at the Caja de Emisión.
From 1914 to 1918 operations through Caja de Emisión explain more than eighty-five percent of the changes in the monetary base. In 1914 these operations were the second source of expansión and in 1915 the primary source of contraction. The explanation, at least for thirty million pesos is the loan given by the government to the banks in August-September 1914, that the banks paid back in 1915. Although this operation was profitable during the war years, Table XIII indicates that it was not widely used. This was due to the foUowing causes: (1) once the war started International capital mobility was severely restrained, in particular gold flows, moreover the United Kingdom and France abandoned the gold standard, the only place where Chilean banks could obtain gold was New York, a financia! center with poor ties to Chile then and (2) Caja de Emisión regulations required the banks to increase their gold deposits whenever the exchange rate rose above twelve pence ($ 20 per pound), furthermore, additional deposits had to be made physically in gold. The nominal exchange rate appreciated by almost thirteen percent from 1915 to 1916, by the second quarter of 1917 the paper peso had risen to 12.362 pence ($ 19.41 per pound) , in December 1917 it reached 14.5 pence ($ 16.55 per pound) and in June 1918 it was at 17.2 pence ($ 13.95), i.e., the paper peso was quoted at almost par with the mythical gold peso of eighteen pence. Banks had to supplement their original gold deposits to meet the market exchange rate, but this operation proved very expensive as the price of gold skyrocketed in terms of the now devalued pound. In 1917 the Chilean gold coin of 0.599103 grams -the gold peso of eighteen pencewas quoted at 20.07 pence, in June 1918 at 23.70 pence and in December 1918 at 21.12 pence. To keep the Caja de Emisión working, the authorities modified its operation allowing any person to opérate with the agency, but more important they established that in case of withdrawal deposits could be paid in bilis of exchange over London or Santiago. At the time the gold coin in Chile was worth twenty-six pence and in London only eighteen pence. It became impossible then for the currency to appreciate beyond eighteen pence because it was always possible to obtain bilis of exchange on London at eighteen pence. Table XI shows that this modification permitted banks to obtain 45.6 million pesos from the Caja. Table XIV shows that not only prices of these commodities fell by more than sixty percent in real terms, but the volume of exports dropped by a record figure: copper by twenty-three percent and nitrate by seventy-three percent. This grim picture improved somewhat during 1920, but it deteriorated again in 1922. The share of copper in exports began to increase rapidly in 1922 while that of nitrate to fall. The real price of nitrate never reached the level of 1913 and nitrate exports increased only by volume expansión. One of the consequences of the external crisis was a sharp depreciation of the peso with respect to pound and the American dollar. Table XV indicates that the Chilean peso depreciated in 1919 by thirty-eight percent with respect to the pound and by fifty percent with respect to the American dollar. From an economic point of view the evolution of the real effective exchange rate is more important because it gives an idea of the reallocation of resources as a consequence of the crisis. The real exchange rate for the period 1919/25 is twenty-nine percent below the average for the 1913/18 period. P^o^T:^\'^2lt^^namonthafterinau-climate became increasingly tense. In January i^zi, guration, a strike in the north was brutally repressed by the army. Workers were protesting the closing of the Oficina San Gregorio. In a confuse episode, 130 people were killed including «workers, women and children.» 2' The government tried to censor news on the incident, but once it became publicly known it had to face serious demonstrations and near riots throughout the country. Political tensión mounted, fueled in part by the authoritarian character of Mr. Alessandri that made compromising quite difficuh. Finally on September 11, 1924 a bloodless coup d'etat interrupted almost one hundred years of constitutional rule. In 1925, the military unable to run the country had to cali Mr. Alessandri back. During the last year of his administration two important reforms took place: (1) a new constitution changed the political system from a parliamentarian one to a presidential one and (2) a set of economic reforms included the establishment of the Central Bank and the adoption of the gold exchange standard.
DO
From 1919 to 1925 monetary policy was almost completely dominated by the crisis, especially its fiscal component. It could have not been otherwise; in 1919 the déficit reached 30.4 percent of expenditures, in 1920-1922, 18.7, 40,5 and 36.8 respectively. In terms of the GDP, these percentages are: 2.89, 1.72, 6.05 and 4.84 respectively. The authorities had no alternatives but to borrow from the private sector. They did so by issuing médium term bonds in the domestic market. But borrowing was not enough and for the first time since 1879, the government had to issue notes for financing a fiscal déficit. The size of the déficit and the populist character of the administration made it politically impossible to address the fiscal crisis through contractionary policy measures: higher taxes and lower expenditures.
The issue of domestic public debt contributed to an increase in the monetary base. As shown in Table XIII Under paper money consistency requirements are less stringent, financial stability is guaranteed by the existence of a smooth mechanism for the creation of high powered money. Ideally this mechanism should be market regulated instead of discretionary changes in the base. The backing requirement for bank notes in mortgage bonds is a good example of this regime. During this period, there was no need for a central bank ñor for a lender of last resort and the system enjoyed sixteen years of remarkable stability. The economy fared well and did not endure the contractionary consequences of the retirement of fiscal notes. The cost of this regime was domestic inflation. Inflation and the ideological commitment to convertibility forced the authorities to abandon paper in favor of gold with the consequences describes in section three.
A paper money regime without a smooth mechanism for the creation of high powered money plus the banks' certainty of the government acting as lender of last resort is not stable. Banks, knowing that the government would come to their rescue, increased the money supply by reducing the deposit-reserve ratio to the edge of insolvency.
A paper money regime with a variety of mechanisms for the creation of high powered money, like the one from 1912 to 1924 proved very solid. It survived WWI and the postwar depression. But the regime could not survive a different inconsistency, that of keeping a stable price level with a rising budget déficit. Domestic inflation, added to a renewed world commitment to the gold standard made the establishment of the central bank cum gold standard possible.
Finally, regarding the exchange regime, the most important requirements for a fix exchange rate regime to work is price flexibility, absolute and relative. The wish list also includes a relatively stable external sector. Domestic prices were not as flexible as required at least at times when flexibility was a necessity and the economy suffered not only from severe external shocks, but from 1880 until 1898 terms of trade secularly declined at a rate of 2.5 percent per year. Under a fix exchange regime, domestic prices need to undergo deflation to accommodate falling terms of trade, it seems unrealistic to expect domestic deflation at a rate of 2.5 percent per year during eighteen years. 
